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ABSTRACT 
Human rights have become an enormously useful tool in our time, and this 
for a variety of reasons. Useful, yes: but are rights real? I propose first to 
examine the most significant philosophical attempts to justify human rights. 
A universally justified conception of rights I call ‘robust,’ since a successful 
rational justification would fully underwrite the real existence of rights. Alas, 
we have no such justification; the second part of my remarks sketches 
devastating objections to each proposed justification. But all is not lost for 
rights: a new pragmatic justification for rights talk is available, one that is 
modest. On the modest view rights are real; but then we should like to know 
whether rights are as useful as they are on the robust view. Not as useful, no; 
but a real tool of some use is superior to a fictional tool of putatively great 
use. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Human rights have become an enormously useful tool in the last century, 
and this for a variety of reasons. Rights remain a moral bulwark against an 
overzealous utilitarianism: where the many would sacrifice the one, rights 
give reason to protect the one.  The logic of cost and benefit is siren song to 
bureaucrats and administrators, promising an overly easy commensuration of 
conflicting values, lives, and choices. Rights talk can prevent grave moral 
harms from being swept under the rug of the ‘costs’ of some favored policy. 
                                                       
* For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to Jim Rice at Lingnan University, 
Hong Kong, to the participants of seminars at National University of Singapore, 
Singapore Management University, Chulalongkorn University (Thailand), Hong Kong 
University, and Hong Kong Baptist University, and especially to Peter Baehr at Lingnan 
University, who helped me clarify the structure of the argument. The research in this 
paper was supported by a Fulbright Grant. 
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In their political conception, human rights help us understand and normalize 
legitimate relations between nation states and their citizens. The language 
and logic of ‘collateral damage’ — a polite term for the allegedly unintended 
destruction and murder that would pass for a side effect of modern military 
actions — threatens to undermine a respect for persons, hiding them in 
blighted post-traumatic landscapes. Rights talk helps us identify such 
violations. The growing literature on human rights serves also as a guide to 
international relations, the cultivation of treaties, and the rhetoric of 
diplomacy. Concern grows worldwide about the effects of pollution, child 
labor, and related harms to people and their environments, in both developed 
and developing nations. Rights talk can be a useful propaedeutic to the 
resolution of such disputes. 
Useful, yes: but why think rights are real? I wish to explore the question 
of how to justify rights. With so many competing theories of rights, it is a 
fool’s errand in a short space to try to address this question in all its 
complexity. Instead, I propose first to examine the most significant 
philosophical attempts to justify human rights. A universally justified 
conception of rights I call ‘robust,’ since a successful rational justification 
would fully underwrite the real existence of rights. Alas, we have no such 
justification; the second part of my remarks sketches devastating objections 
to each attempted justification. But all is not lost for rights: a new pragmatic 
conception of rights talk is available, one that is modest. Its modesty appears 
in declining to think that a single, universal argument can do the job and in 
refusing to assume a standpoint of universal rationality. The justification of 
rights takes place piecemeal and in a context of dialectical inquiry, and it is 
impossible to say in advance how that inquiry will go. I will not try to 
provide yet another robust justification of rights here — such an attempt 
would undercut my thesis that no such justification can succeed. Instead, I 
propose a picture of what resolving disputes about rights can look like once 
we abandon the standpoint of universal rationality. I am characterizing 
modest rights debates, not resolving them. 
On the modest view rights are real; but then we should like to know 
whether rights are as useful as they would be if the justification could be 
robust. Not as useful, no; but a real tool of some use is superior to a fictional 
tool of putatively great use. My conclusion might disturb the friends of 
rights; but those friends ought to moderate their notion of what rights talk 
can do. My conclusion might also disturb the opponents of rights; those 
opponents might seek to justify oppression or discrimination, which rights 
talk can resist. The justification of rights is modest, not robust, and the 
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sooner our rhetoric takes account of that fact, the more adequate it will be to 
its tasks. 
 
 
2. Robust View 
 
The human rights I will address are moral rights, not conventional. 
Conventional rights such as legal or political rights are those that some 
system of rules grants to some individuals. Legal systems grant rights to 
citizens and residents of the territory to which those systems apply. Political 
rights, such as the right to vote, are similarly granted to individuals in virtue 
of their meeting such criteria as age and residency. Rights to make and 
enforce contracts are also conventional rights. The central feature of moral 
rights, then, is that individuals hold moral rights independent of what other 
rights (if any) a legal, political, or other rule system might grant them. Moral 
rights are not granted rights; if not different in kind from conventional rights, 
moral rights must have a ground or justification independent of conferral by 
some system of rules. A political right can coincide with a moral right, for 
example if we have a moral right to education and a government explicitly 
legislates such a right. But the rights are still distinct: whatever grounds the 
moral right is distinct from, and conceptually prior to, the acts of 
government that confer the political right. 
Nothing in my argument hangs on whether human rights are alienable, 
forfeitable, or prescriptible. My right is alienable if I can voluntarily 
relinquish it. My right is forfeitable if I can lose it involuntarily as a result of 
some wrongful act. My right is prescriptible if some third party can take it 
away from me, with or without my consent. On some accounts of human 
rights, some rights are alienable: for example, you might give up your right 
to an education at state expense in order to take a high-paying job in sports. 
Similarly, on some accounts a right might be forfeitable: my right to vote 
might be forfeit in case I commit a felony. And again, on some accounts a 
right might be prescriptible, as when a right to due process is suspended in 
wartime. I mention these rights as illustrations only; any list of human rights 
is controversial, and I will not need to endorse any particular list.  
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Human rights are unconditional and high-priority.1 A right is conditional 
just in case the right holder must meet certain conditions (such as age, 
residency, occupation) before holding the right. Many conventional rights are 
conditional in this way. Human rights are unconditional, except in the 
minimal sense that one must be human to have them. Human rights are also 
high-priority inasmuch as they cannot easily be overridden by countervailing 
considerations, such as expense, inconvenience, or national security. If a 
theory permits human rights to conflict, then it owes an account of how such 
conflicts can be resolved. The point of calling a right high-priority is to 
emphasize that it is difficult, though not impossible, to override a rights 
claim. 
Human rights are universal, in that they apply to all nations and all their 
citizens.2 These rights are thus not culturally specific or culturally relative. 
They are not conventional in any way that would make cultural differences 
relevant to the assignment of rights. Human rights as treated in international 
law do, however, have a historical limitation. Many rights documents confer 
rights that would be silly if thought of as trans-historical: due process rights, 
for example, presuppose modern judicial systems. So whereas we might agree 
that slavery as practiced in ancient Greece violated a basic liberty right of 
the slaves, it would be odd to claim that their enslavement violated their due 
process rights. Still, many philosophical treatments of human rights apply 
them trans-historically as well as trans-culturally. 
Human rights might include individual or group rights, though most 
accounts make individual rights basic. They might concern security, liberty, 
or welfare. They might protect freedoms, political participation, or due 
process. I leave open the substance of human rights, or the question of what 
human rights are rights to. Human rights talk is generally relevant in the 
context of relations between states and their individual citizens, but it might 
also apply in other contexts; I will not restrict its applicability. Human rights 
might or might not be Hohfeldian bundles (claims, liberties, powers, or 
immunities).3 They might be negative or positive or some of each. Since the 
                                                       
1 These terms and the treatment of them here come from James Nickel’s entry on ‘Human 
Rights’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/). 
2 See Nickel, ‘Human Rights.’ 
3 See the classic discussion of rights in Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning, Yale University Press, 1919. Hohfeld was, 
of course, discussing legal rights and not moral rights; yet many of his fundamental 
distinctions have been carried over into discussions of moral rights. See especially Joel 
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dispute is about rights and not the substance of rights per se, nothing that I 
will say hangs on deciding substantive issues one way or another. 
A central feature of human rights, however, is that they require 
justification. We should not follow the authors of the Declaration of 
Independence in thinking that rights are ‘self-evident’: human rights are 
widely disputed around the world, and such disputes give the lie to claims of 
self-evidence. The friends of rights claim that these justifications are robust 
and once-for-all.4 Universal justifications of human rights fall into four 
primary types. 
 
 
3. Natural rights justification 
 
One approach to justifying human rights regards them as natural. Natural 
rights are built into human nature, perhaps having a ground in creation by a 
divine power. A curious feature of theories of natural human rights is that 
the proponents of these theories often fail to address the sense in which the 
rights are natural.5 One kind of moral intuitionist might insist that natural 
rights are sui generis properties of human beings. On such a view, it is simply 
a brute fact about human beings that they have human rights. A more 
satisfying defense of human rights in this tradition will tie moral rights to the 
possession of a natural property (or bundle of them). Sumner defines a 
natural rights theory as ‘any moral theory which contains rights whose 
criterion is natural, and natural rights are any such rights.’6 The details of 
such a theory need not detain us: it turns out that we have good reason to 
deny that any naturalistic approach to rights will provide sufficient 
justification of the robust view. 
Beyond natural rights theories, the most common philosophical 
approaches to the justification of rights are the transcendental, 
contractarian, and utilitarian approaches.  
________________________________________ 
Feinberg, Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy, Princeton 
University Press, 1980. 
4 Nickel claims that human rights must have a robust justification, though he says that 
such justifications need not be ‘irresistible’; see Nickel, op cit. 
5 L. W. Sumner says, ‘Furthermore, it is a curiosity of the modern debate that only scant 
attention has been given to the question of what makes such rights natural.’ See The 
Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 94. Even the so-called 
classical writers on natural rights said little about why the rights were natural. 
6 Ibid., p. 103. 
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3.1. Transcendental justification 
 
A prominent recent friend of rights is Alan Gewirth. He has argued for basic 
human rights to freedom and well-being on the grounds that these are 
‘necessary goods’ that constitute ‘the generic features of successful action.’7 
Gewirth makes two fundamental moves: first, each of us must possess an 
individual right to freedom and well-being, and second, each of us must 
accept that everyone else has these rights to the same degree as ourselves. It 
follows that universal moral rights, or human rights, exist (CR, 17). 
Gewirth defends the first of these claims with the following argument: 
I do X for end or purpose E. 
E is good. 
My freedom and well-being are necessary goods. 
I must have freedom and well-being. 
I have rights to freedom and well-being. 
If you reject (5), then you must reject: ‘All other persons ought at least to 
refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being.’ 
If you reject the statement in (6), then you must accept that ‘Other 
persons may remove or interfere with my freedom and well-being.’ 
If you accept the statement in (7), then you must accept that ‘It is 
permissible that I not have freedom and well-being.’ 
Since (8) contradicts (4), we must reject it, which logically commits us to 
accepting (5), the first of Gewirth’s main claims.  
The rationale for these claims might not be transparent. Gewirth calls our 
attention to the generic features of action in the first two premises. Whenever 
I act for reasons, I aim at some end or purpose which I take to be good in 
some respect, and the apparent goodness of that end is at least a major 
component of my reasons for acting. (3) follows from the fact that ‘freedom 
and well-being are the proximate necessary conditions of the agent’s acting to 
attain any … purposes and thus any goods’ (CR, 17). ‘Well-being’ here refers 
merely to minimal conditions of being a person capable of acting in the 
world. Clearly, in order to be such a person, I must be at least somewhat free 
to choose my actions and I must be sufficiently well to act on such choices. 
Gewirth has identified minimal conditions of rational agency. 
                                                       
7 Alan Gewirth, The Community of Rights, University of Chicago Press, 1996, p. 18. 
Subsequent references to this text cite CR. 
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The move from (4) to (5) is the most controversial in the argument, and 
we shall return to it below. The remaining premises of the argument 
represent a reductio intended to support the inference from (4) to (5). To 
compromise freedom or well-being is incompatible with our own agency: to 
will that those conditions may be removed or interfered with would be to 
contradict ourselves in our every action. Hence, I must accept that I have a 
right to freedom and well-being. The argument is transcendental in that it 
defends rights as a condition of the possibility of human agency. 
Yet this individual right falls short of being a universal moral right. The 
argument for the second main claim extends this conclusion to every human 
being. Every person must accept (CR, 18–19): 
I have rights to freedom and well-being because I am a prospective 
purposive agent. 
It follows that all prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom 
and well-being. 
Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as yourself. 
[Principle of Generic Consistency] 
The move from (9) to (10) is sanctioned by the fact that the ground for 
asserting my own rights to freedom and well-being are shared by every other 
human being. We are all, or nearly all, prospective purposive agents. And so 
we reach a principle requiring that we respect the basic human rights of 
others, articulated as an imperative in (11). From these basic human rights, 
Gewirth has gone on to derive a range of other rights, including rights to 
productive agency, private property, economic democracy, and political 
democracy. Our focus must, however, remain on the initial justification of 
the basic human rights which ground the others. 
 
3.2. Contractarian justification 
 
Contractarian justifications of rights take a distinctive form. The background 
of the argument typically takes for granted a subjectivity about goods that is 
both thoroughgoing and ineliminable. Rational debate cannot settle 
questions about goods, and so the best we can do is reach some social 
consensus concerning the right (and rights). If values were objective, we 
would have no need to resort to a contractual procedure to agree about them: 
chemists never do concerning the facts of chemistry. Moral consensus is to be 
reached by a two step process. First, we identify an initial position from 
which to negotiate the contract or bargain. Second, we move by fair 
procedures to an agreement concerning basic principles and rights around 
which to organize our society. One finds this kind of argument in Hobbes, 
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Locke, and Kant as well as in such latter-day representatives as Gauthier, 
Nozick, and Rawls. 
Consider Rawls’s contractarianism. Rawls describes the initial position as 
the ‘original position,’ whose most notable feature is the ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
This device is designed to ensure that negotiators choose genuinely fair 
principles by shielding from their deliberations all contingent facts about the 
material conditions of their actual lives. When we are ignorant about where 
we stand in society, the thinking goes, we are most likely to choose principles 
of justice that are fair for all. 
According to Rawls, the parties in the original position are both rational 
and mutually disinterested: they aim to do best for themselves in choosing 
principles of justice while recognizing that, due to the veil, in important ways 
they do not know who they are. The principles of justice, Rawls concludes, 
are those that rational individuals would choose in the original position 
behind the veil of ignorance. These turn out to be the principles of equal basic 
liberty for all and the difference principle, according to which any 
inequalities in society (especially but not only material inequalities) should be 
arranged so that the least well-off benefit from them. Both principles ground 
rights in Rawls’s theory. 
These principles of justice are well-known and require little comment 
from me. I will instead call attention to two features of Rawls’s argument. 
First, the deliberations of the parties in the original position are governed by 
a principle of rationality (called ‘maximin’) that aims to secure for each of 
them the best worst-case scenario. Rawls assumes that people are all risk-
averse in a quite specific way: that when confronted with a choice under 
circumstances of uncertainty or ignorance, as the parties are, all will choose 
in order to make the worst outcome as good as possible, thus maximizing the 
minimum. This is, of course, an empirical assumption that turns out to be 
largely false: many people are not risk averse in this way.8 But this empirical 
issue is not the crucial difficulty with Rawls’s argument, nor is it a general 
feature of contractarian justifications of rights. A more serious problem arises 
from contractarians having to specify a conception of rationality and an 
account of an initial position, as we shall see shortly. 
                                                       
8 Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated that people have a range of attitudes toward 
risk; see for example Judgment under uncertainty : heuristics and biases, edited by Daniel 
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Rawls 
arbitrarily dismisses this range of attitudes as being ‘special psychologies’ outside the 
scope of his argument; see Justice as Fairness : A Restatement, edited by Erin Kelly, 
Harvard University Press, 2001. 
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The second feature of Rawls’s argument is that the parties in the original 
position take for granted a list of ‘primary goods’ which they seek to secure 
for themselves: 
basic rights and liberties, also given by a list;9 
freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background 
of diverse opportunities; 
powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility in the 
political and economic institutions of the basic structure; 
income and wealth; and finally, 
the social bases of self-respect.10 
These are goods which Rawls takes to be essential conditions or 
components of any successful human life. The Rawlsian procedure for 
establishing moral rights under justice takes this list for granted, and the 
success of the morally neutral procedure in yielding moral rights will depend 
partly on the correctness of this list. The agents in the original position who 
choose the principles of justice choose so as to secure these goods, including 
‘basic rights and liberties.’ Rawls thus justifies human rights by appeal to 
what rational agents would choose behind the veil of ignorance. 
 
3.3. Consequentialist justification 
 
Of all the major philosophical justifications of rights, the consequentialist 
views are the most conflicted. Consequentialism is the view that the moral 
rightness of acts is to be determined strictly in terms of their consequences. 
The consequentialist turns Rawls on his head, asserting the priority of the 
good over the right. As a result, consequentialism defines right action as that 
which yields the good, or at least the best feasible outcome. Since its earliest 
conceptions, consequentialism has had difficulty with the concept of rights: 
Bentham declares natural moral rights to be ‘nonsense on stilts,’ but John 
Stuart Mill devotes an inordinately long chapter of Utilitarianism to justice 
and the defense of rights. 
A sophisticated consequentialist defense of rights comes from L.W. 
Sumner, who points to the distinction between a criterion of right and a 
decision procedure.11 The former determines the best act in given 
                                                       
9 Rawls’s treatment of basic rights as primary goods has a transcendental element to it: he 
defines primary goods as those required for the pursuit of any life plan whatsoever. 
10 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 181. 
11 L. W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1987; 
subsequent references to this work will cite MFR. 
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circumstances; but employing a consequentialist criterion as a decision 
procedure can require informational, cognitive, and other resources that we 
simply do not possess. So suppose that our criterion of right action is to 
maximize agent-neutral value; using that criterion to determine what we 
should do will require that we know: (a) all possible alternative courses of 
action, (b) the consequences of each alternative, (c) the likelihood of each 
consequence, given that we choose a specific alternative, (d) how much agent-
neutral value each consequence yields, (e) the expected value of each 
alternative, expressed mathematically and weighted by its likelihood of 
occurring. The computational demands of a single choice would be 
staggering, and such demands suggest that straightforwardly seeking to 
maximize agent-neutral value is not a feasible decision procedure for 
deliberators like us. 
Sumner argues that to take our limited cognitive position into account, 
we ought to constrain our decision making by respecting rights. Doing so, he 
argues, is a better decision strategy than straightforwardly maximizing. ‘Our 
rationale for endorsing this pre-commitment [to respect rights], in advance of 
considering particular cases, rests largely on our lack of confidence that we 
will be able to project costs and benefits accurately in those cases’ (MFR, 
192). In other words, given our limitations, we are more likely to maximize 
agent-neutral value by respecting rights than by merely aiming to maximize 
agent-neutral value. Sumner chooses an example from contemporary 
bioethics to support his argument (MFR, 182-85). Institutional Review 
Boards (IRB’s) — the bodies that oversee the ethical propriety of scientific 
and medical research at North American and many other universities —
typically aim to ensure that scientific research does more good than harm. 
This objective is recognizably consequentialist, though the practice of such 
boards is more akin to satisfying than maximizing. In addition, IRB’s strive 
to protect research participants’ autonomy rights. This concern recognizes a 
defeasible right in participants to informed consent. The right is defeasible 
inasmuch as certain forms of deception research (to pick one example) can be 
justified even though the participants do not sign informed consent prior to 
participating. Yet the right does genuine work in constraining the 
researchers’ pursuit of knowledge. 
The conclusion seems paradoxical: constraint is maximizing. Sumner’s 
example helps to show why. Merely seeking to maximize the benefit-to-risk 
ratio might lead researchers to undertake experiments in which the risk fell 
disproportionately on a small number of the participants. Such research 
might or might not maximize agent-neutral value; that is difficult for an IRB 
to foresee. A direct strategy of maximizing would be demonstrably superior 
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to a constrained strategy only for a committee that did not share our 
limitations. We therefore constrain our maximizing by respecting the rights 
of the participants. By constraining our decision procedure in this way, we 
expect to realize more value in the end. Or so goes the consequentialist 
argument for rights. 
 
 
4. Mythical Rights 
 
The arguments proposed above fail to provide universal rational 
justifications of human rights. I do not pretend to have canvassed every 
possible justification for human rights, or even every possible kind of 
justification. But I have treated examples of the most sophisticated 
arguments available, and most other philosophical arguments fall into one of 
the kinds that I have sketched. The objections that I will develop apply to 
the kinds, and not only to the examples. 
 
4.1. Natural Rights Arguments 
 
Theological arguments for natural rights seek to justify the existence of 
rights by appeal to divine activity, especially in creating human beings with 
a fundamental dignity that human rights protect. Such arguments, to be 
distinctively theological, appeal to scriptural or other theological premises. 
Only the faithful accept these premises. Consequently, these arguments are 
not sufficiently robust to defend human rights on universally rational 
grounds. Whatever appeal theological arguments might hold for religious 
believers, the friends of rights usually prefer to cast their nets wider. 
The objection to intuitionist arguments is that they are not arguments at 
all. The intuitionist insistence that human beings have universal rights is just 
that: an insistence, not an argument. This kind of approach fails to justify 
rights. Furthermore, it fails to give opponents of rights any reason to believe 
that rights exist at all. 
But the most famous objection to natural rights theories come from 
Bentham.12 His argument is brief: there can be no rights without rules. There 
can be no natural moral rules, thus there can be no natural moral rights. 
                                                       
12 See Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ed. J. H. 
Burns and H. L. A. Hart, Athlone Press, 1970. For a recapitulation of Bentham’s 
argument, see Sumner, MFR chapter 4. 
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Sumner’s gloss on this argument begins by explaining that rights claims 
generally exist in social settings and are constrained by social rules governing 
who may claim a right and under what circumstances. If there are natural 
moral rights, then these will require natural moral rules for their application. 
Second, we can elucidate the premise that no natural moral rules exist by 
contrast with natural (that is, non-conventional) rules such as rules of 
arithmetic and logic. These rule systems are real and natural, but they have 
no distinctively moral content and thus cannot confer rights. Physical causal 
laws are natural, but also confer no moral rights. A consequentialist like 
Sumner can even recognize the existence of moral rights, yet he would deny 
that rights are natural. They are conventional rights that achieve a certain 
status in virtue of their justification by moral theory. In sum, we should 
accept Bentham’s second premise because no one can provide non-
conventional existence conditions for a natural moral rule system. A prior 
commitment to a religious or moral system that recognizes universal natural 
moral rules provides at most conventional existence conditions. Thus we have 
no reason to believe in natural rights. And since a robust view of justifying 
rights is (or would be) a universal rational justification open to all, we should 
deny that natural rights can meet the standard of the robust view. 
 
4.2. Transcendental Arguments 
 
The transcendental argument offered by Gewirth contends that, since 
freedom and well-being are necessary conditions of human agency, each 
individual must claim a right to these as a condition of the possibility of 
exercising that agency. Moreover, that claim is generalizable to every other 
agent. We may grant that freedom and well-being, as Gewirth defines these 
terms, are necessary conditions of agency. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued 
that it does not follow that each of us has a right to freedom and well-being.13 
Gewirth’s argument is invalid. 
To see why, note that if Gewirth is right about the necessary conditions of 
agency, then this fact is a quite objective state of affairs, independent of one’s 
cultural or historical setting. One must have a measure of freedom and well-
being in order to act, whether or not one’s language has these concepts. But I 
cannot claim to have human rights unless I possess the relevant concept of a 
universal, role-independent right. For me to claim a human right to freedom 
                                                       
13 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, 1984, p. 66. 
Subsequent references will cite AV. 
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and well-being I must also inhabit a social order in which claims of this sort 
are intelligible utterances and concepts such as freedom and well-being are 
available for framing them. To assert that I have these rights even when I 
cannot intelligibly claim them is to beg the question: Gewirth’s burden is to 
justify the view that these rights are universal, not to assume it.  
But the objection that Gewirth has to meet is precisely that those forms 
of human behavior which presuppose notions of some ground to entitlement, 
such as the notion of a right, always have a highly specific and socially local 
character, and that the existence of particular types of social institution or 
practice is a necessary condition for the notion of a claim to the possession of 
a right being an intelligible type of human performance (AV, 67). 
So if a society lacked the relevant concepts of universal claims, then these 
notions could not function intelligibly in that social order. To insist that 
people from such a culture must claim human rights when they lack the 
concepts that would enable them to make those claims is to presuppose the 
very universality of rights that Gewirth seeks to prove. 
MacIntyre overstates the case against rights, as I will argue in the third 
part below. He is right to say that claim rights do not follow logically from 
mere necessary conditions for agency. Gewirth’s robust justification fails. But 
it is possible to attribute claims to people who are unable to express those 
claims: if torture is a form of cruelty that is always and everywhere wrong, 
for example, then it might be intelligible to say that everyone has a right not 
to be tortured, even if not everyone is in a position to claim this right. 
 
4.3. Contractarian Arguments 
 
Contractarians regard human rights as conventional rights that have 
attained special status in virtue of being justified by a hypothetical 
agreement, in the form of the social contract. The structure of that 
justification always includes two moments: an initial position from which 
people negotiate the contract, and a set of morally neutral procedures for 
determining the substance of the contract.  
Many difficulties attend contractarian arguments. Among those that need 
not detain us is concern about why a hypothetical agreement among 
members of society should actually bind anyone. I might have signed a 
contract to buy a car, but that fact alone does not obligate me to buy it. In 
fact a far more serious and devastating objection awaits the contractarian, as 
Sumner has pointed out (MFR, 160). For if the contractarian’s goal is to 
justify human rights, and the procedures for determining the substance of the 
contract are morally neutral, then the moral content must come from 
Michael Byron 
 483
somewhere. Typically, it appears in the initial position: when it does, the 
justification of rights must be quite circular. Yet where no moral content 
appears in the initial position, it seems impossible for the procedures to 
justify the moral constraints imposed by recognizing rights. 
This dilemma confronts Rawls, as it does every other contractarian. In 
his case, the procedures for determining the principles of justice and 
corresponding rights are those of rational choice theory, which we may grant 
to be morally neutral. The fairness of the resulting principles is guaranteed by 
the fairness of the original position. By depriving parties to the original 
position of any information about their actual identity and social status, 
Rawls intends to model impartiality with the original position. The parties 
seek to secure for themselves as great a share of the primary goods as they 
can, consistent with not knowing their identity. Since basic rights and 
liberties are among the primary goods, the parties will rationally choose 
principles that protect these rights. But the standard of fairness built into the 
original position by the device of the veil of ignorance itself receives — and 
can receive — no contractarian justification. Rational choice never justifies 
the impartiality and fairness of the original position; rather, Rawls installs 
them. Thus his contractarian justification of rights impales itself on one horn 
of Sumner’s dilemma. 
Other contractarians fare no better. Rights are moral constraints. The 
moral justification of these constraints must stem from the moral content of 
the initial position. If the initial position is not itself fair, or impartial, or 
equal, or otherwise morally contentful, then we cannot expect a contract 
generated by morally neutral rules to yield genuinely moral constraints. If 
the initial position has moral content, then the contract fails to justify the 
moral content of the constraints. In no case can the contractarian claim to 
have justified human rights.14 
 
4.4. Consequentialist Arguments 
 
The difficulty with any consequentialist attempt to justify human rights is 
that it always runs the danger that respecting human rights will not in actual 
practice bring about the best outcome. In other words, respecting human 
rights might on occasion be morally wrong. Sumner’s strategy seeks to 
overcome this difficulty in two ways. First, he emphasizes that rights are 
defeasible: yes, we have a right to autonomy in a medical research context, 
                                                       
14 Add note here about foundationalism and reflective equilibrium. 
Human Rights: A Modest Proposal 
 484
but that right can be overridden in cases where the research promises 
important benefits, the risk to the participant is negligible, and the 
researchers debrief the participants afterwards as a component of the 
protocol. This emphasis on the defeasibility of rights reminds us that rights 
function as constraints on maximizing, but that those constraints are not 
absolute and need not get in the way of doing the right thing. 
The second central feature of Sumner’s argument is his relocation of the 
constraint, from a constraint on what counts as the right action to a 
constraint on how we pursue our consequentialist goal. By having rights 
constrain our decision procedure rather than the criterion of right, Sumner 
finesses the issue about whether respecting rights can be wrong. In fact, it 
can be wrong, according to the criterion; but, he argues, in our cognitively 
limited position we will be most likely to bring about the best outcome if we 
constrain our choices by respecting rights. Hence, consequentialists can 
expect to do best in the long run by respecting rights. 
But what neither of these innovative ideas can correct is 
consequentialism’s incapacity to permit any distinction between what James 
Nickel calls a high-priority goal and a right.15 Sumner’s treatment of rights 
makes them a kind of high-priority goal within the consequentialist’s decision 
procedure: we seek to protect research participants’ autonomy to a great 
extent. And for many kinds of defeasible right, this approach will work just 
fine. Yet it seems to miss what Nickel calls the mandatory character of some 
rights: it is at least possible that some rights are not defeasible, or are 
defeasible only in certain quite limited ways, and that otherwise the claims 
embodied in those rights are mandatory.  
Even high-priority goals can be pursued in various ways and can be 
deferred when prospects for progress seem dim or when other opportunities 
are present. Rights, however, are more definite than goals; they specify who 
is entitled to receive a certain mode of treatment (the rightholders) and who 
must act on specific occasions to make the treatment available (the 
addressees)…. Rights are also distinctive not only in their high priority and 
definiteness but also in their mandatory character. It is these three 
features—high priority, definiteness, and bindingness—that make the rights 
vocabulary attractive in formulating minimal standards of decent 
governmental conduct. This character would be lost if we were to deconstruct 
rights into mere goals or ideals.16 
                                                       
15 James W. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights, University of California Press, 1987. 
16 Ibid., p. 17f. 
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We might insist, for example, that torture is never morally justifiable; 
that everyone has a right not to be tortured. Such a mandatory right seems 
at least possible. Yet consequentialism’s treatment of human rights as high-
priority goals makes it impossible for anyone to have such a right. By 
flattening out the distinction between rights and high-priority goals, 
Sumner’s view cannot reach a crucial corner in the conceptual space of rights. 
Sumner might bite the bullet here and try to show that all rights are 
defeasible, but his argument suffers another serious defect. For we should 
notice that he does not in fact provide a consequentialist defense of human 
rights. Sumner offers a consequentialist defense of respecting rights, which is 
altogether different. When he shifts the defense of rights into the sphere of 
decision-making rather than the criterion of right, Sumner treats rights 
instrumentally. It does not matter on his view whether anyone has any rights 
whatsoever. For all he says about them, human rights might be quite 
fictional. It is one thing to argue that people have rights, and quite another 
to argue that we should treat them as if they had rights. Sumner does only 
the latter, giving us no grounds whatever for believing that people in fact 
have rights. This objection might not concern a consequentialist, who after 
all is more concerned with maximizing value. But it will concern friends of 
human rights who seek a robust justification of them.17 
Given the structure of consequentialist moral theories, we can expect one 
or both of these issues to infect any consequentialist attempt to justify 
human rights. Consequentialists might, of course, attempt to build into their 
conception of value the idea that protecting rights is good; a Parfitian 
objective list consequentialist could do so, for example. But this move clearly 
collapses the space between a right and a high-priority goal, since it defines 
the protection of rights as a high-priority goal. On the other hand, attempts 
like Sumner’s to provide a consequentialist defense of respecting human 
rights simply fail to justify their existence. Either way, the consequentialist 
defense of human rights fails. 
 
 
 
 
                                                       
17 I am grateful to Michael Pelczar at National University of Singapore for pressing me on 
this last point: consequentialists might wonder why the friends of rights would not be 
satisfied with the state of affairs in which rights are not real but society respects 
everyone’s rights. On that view, rights talk should be strictly eliminable; I consider the 
value of continuing to talk about rights below. 
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5. Modest View 
 
MacIntyre notes dryly that the argument for the claim that human rights do 
not exist takes exactly the same form as the argument for the claim that 
witches and unicorns do not exist: no one has provided an adequate 
justification for thinking that they do exist (AV, 69). That is an impossibility 
claim, of course, and impossibility claims are notoriously difficult to 
establish. I certainly will not undertake to establish it here. I have taken 
some of the strongest representatives of attempted philosophical 
justifications of rights, and shown that these attempts are subject to 
devastating objections that affect the entire species of argument that each 
represents. Defenders of these arguments strive to overcome these objections, 
but no such attempt to date seems as compelling as the objections. In light of 
these arguments, we have a strong prima facie case against a robust 
justification of rights. 
I state this conclusion with some care, since I believe that human rights 
talk looks different once we stop seeking a robust justification of them. We 
could, for example, follow Jeffrey Stout in adopting what I call a modest 
view of justifying human rights.18 Stout briefly characterizes rights this way: 
‘All rights are normative social statuses. To have the status of a right is to 
have a legitimate claim on others for the enjoyment of a good’ (DT, 204). So 
far, of course, the friends of human rights can agree: the issue between robust 
and modest views concerns precisely the question of legitimacy. 
 
5.1. Rights holders and rights 
 
Stout explores the historical development of rights talk and examines the 
social contexts within which we determine the legitimacy of rights claims. 
The history of rights talk links rights claims—not initially universal human 
rights—to the going social order: kings, lords, serfs, parents, children, and so 
on all have legitimate claims in various social orders, and the claims that 
individuals may legitimately make depend on which roles they happen to 
occupy. Prior to the Enlightenment, when rights talk began to take its 
distinctively modern shape, rights were strictly role-specific and not 
                                                       
18 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, Princeton University Press, 2004; subsequent 
references will cite DT. Stout refers to the discussion of rights and responsibilities in 
Annette Baier, Moral Prejudices, Harvard University Press, 1994, especially chapter 11, 
‘Claims, Rights, Responsibilities.’ 
Michael Byron 
 487
universal: a central constituent of occupying a given role in a given social 
order was that one could legitimately claim some goods and that one could 
not legitimately claim others. Obligations were similarly role-specific. Few 
people have any objection to this conception of rights as the legitimate claims 
of social-role holders. Stout discovers the emergence of the modern 
conception of human rights in the emergence of a new kind of social role: that 
of a rights and responsibility holder as such. 
Stout argues that we might have unconditional obligations and 
responsibilities of a sort characteristic of universal human rights. The 
example he singles out concerns torture: I have an unconditional obligation 
not to torture anyone. Torture is always and everywhere wrong. That 
certainly sounds appealing to the friends of rights: if I have such an 
obligation, then presumably we may acknowledge that everyone has the 
right not to be tortured. Stout attributes to everyone an unconditional 
obligation not to torture (and a corresponding unconditional right not to be 
tortured), even as he recognizes that not everyone will accept such an 
obligation or even understand it. 
Suppose that a monk participating in the Spanish Inquisition tortures 
someone. Stout argues that such a monk might be quite blameless in not 
accepting a norm unconditionally prohibiting torture; based on all his 
available evidence, concepts, and norms, he might reasonably (though 
falsely) conclude that torture is permissible in certain instances. In this 
situation we should be inclined to hold the monk justified given his evidence, 
but nonetheless wrong about torture. That stance would be comparable to the 
stance we take with regard to ancient astronomical views: people might have 
been justified to think that the sun went around the earth, but they were 
wrong about it. Stout suggests that this case would be quite different from 
that of a contemporary dictator who used torture as part of a widespread 
campaign to suppress dissent and opposition. The dictator would, if ignorant 
of the norms that prohibit cruelty, very likely be culpably ignorant. And in 
that case we should condemn his actions differently, since it makes a 
difference if the monk could not have known better.  
If Stout is right and the monk has an unconditional obligation not to 
torture, then the monk was wrong to do it. Yet as we have described the case, 
the monk could not have known that he was in the wrong. Stout insists that 
the scope of unconditional norms or obligations is universal, even though 
their statement and rationale is couched in the particular language of a 
historically situated individual. 
I need not suppose that the monk (given his social perspective) would in 
fact be able to acknowledge the force of the reason I acknowledge. There can 
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be such a reason, and it can be a decisive reason when placed in the context of 
my collateral commitments, even if the monk and various others have no 
reason to treat it as such (DT, 196). 
What is Stout saying? The monk has obligations of which he could know 
nothing, and he would not accept Stout’s justification for those obligations 
even if he did know of them? When I recalled MacIntyre’s argument against 
Gewirth, I raised similar considerations for rejecting Gewirth’s argument. 
MacIntyre resists the idea of universal claims on the grounds that not every 
culture supports the kinds of claims that we recognize as human rights. How 
is it that I can regard MacIntyre’s point as telling against Gewirth and yet 
support Stout? 
The difference lies in what we should count as universal. Stout says, ‘an 
obligation can be universal in the sense of applying (as we see it) to everyone, 
without requiring a supposedly universal point of view … for its justification’ 
(DT, 195). In this claim lies the basis for distinguishing modest justifications 
of rights from robust ones. The putative justifications for human rights that 
we have examined so far have required a universal point of view. The 
transcendental, contractarian, and consequentialist modes of justification are 
all universal in Stout’s second sense, as they propose to be trans-cultural and 
grounded in universal reason. Stout’s view of the justification of human 
rights is modest: he speaks of genuine universal rights, yet without giving 
them a robust, universal justification. MacIntyre’s objection to Gewirth 
works because Gewirth is committed to thinking that the rights possessors 
themselves must assert a universal claim to freedom and well-being. They 
must therefore already possess the concept of such claims in order to make 
them. Nothing in Stout’s view commits him to saying that the holders of 
human rights must claim them, and so he escapes MacIntyre’s objection. 
What is modest about the modest view is not the rights themselves, but 
rather the mode of justification we can deploy in support of their existence. 
The friends and opponents of human rights make the same error: they both 
assume that human rights stand in need of a robust justification, grounded in 
a transcendent, universal point of view. I have argued that the best examples 
of such justifications fail; but I resist MacIntyre’s conclusion that these 
failures should lead us to deny the existence of human rights. Rather, they 
should lead us to question the need for such justifications. But without such a 
justification, how could we persuade others that human rights exist? 
 
 
 
 
Michael Byron 
 489
5.2. Justifying rights 
 
Stout’s ‘universal rights without universal justification’ move might seem 
doubly suspicious. First, Stout helps himself to the concepts of universal 
human rights and obligations, clearly intending for these to do some kind of 
important philosophical work (we will explore the work he expects them to 
do shortly). But without some kind of universal justification, why should 
opponents of those rights accept that they exist? Why should anyone? 
Second, Stout’s approach might seem to be mere assertion: granting that no 
universal justification of rights succeeds, Stout now seems merely to assert 
the existence of such rights. But mere assertion is no argument. 
We might finesse the question of the universality of norms by describing 
them as responsibilities attaching instead to a specific social role. 
Instead of saying that unconditional obligations apply to everyone 
(period), we could say that they apply to all holders of the (democratically 
basic) role of norm user. A norm user is anyone who possesses the expressive 
resources to exchange reasons for and against explicit normative claims. Then 
democrats can be seen as committed to conscripting everyone they can into 
this role: the young by educating them, the foreign by offering them reasons 
and asking them for reasons, the dead by imagining ourselves in conversation 
with them (DT, 197). 
Stout seems to be suggesting that we treat unconditional norms as 
applying in principle to anyone, or at any rate to everyone capable of giving 
and getting reasons. A ‘norm user’ is anyone who thinks about what they will 
do—everyone who judges right and wrong.  This category is ‘democratically 
basic’ because it includes the demos—the people; Stout observes that a 
constitutive element of recognizing universal obligations and rights is a 
commitment to expanding the scope of democracy as widely as possible. 
How does all of this bear on the issue of justifying rights? When Stout 
claims that a ruthless dictator violates people’s rights by torturing them, 
Stout commits himself to ‘conscripting’ the dictator and his subjects into the 
role of ‘norm user.’ Conscripting them into this role, in the case of foreigners, 
requires among other things engaging them in dialectical inquiry concerning 
the acceptability of torture. That inquiry must be governed by norms of 
reaching the truth concerning rights, and it will aim to bring the interlocutor 
to a contradiction. Nothing guarantees that Stout would win the debate with 
the dictator; Stout might come away convinced that, in fact, some rare 
instances of torture are acceptable. Or the dictator might come to share 
Stout’s view. Or the dialogue might break down—or never get off the 
ground—for any number of reasons. But moral justification in Stout’s vision 
Human Rights: A Modest Proposal 
 490
of the democratic tradition is a process of exchanging reasons, with the 
practical aim of reaching agreement on what to do. The modest view of 
justifying rights is committed by the universal scope of universal human 
rights to a kind of moral outreach. Since this view holds that everyone (or at 
least every norm user) has rights and obligations, merely qua norm user, 
friends of human rights must attempt where appropriate to convince people 
that they have such rights and obligations. 
Notice that this argument does not offer us a single overarching 
justification of rights. Stout’s own belief that torture is wrong depends on his 
concept of cruelty and the wrongness of that. My view is that violating 
human rights prevents us from flourishing by precluding us from realizing a 
range of values and virtues that would constitute a good human life. You 
might have a still different story. The justification of rights to specific others 
proceeds ad hoc and provisionally, and no single argument can demonstrate 
to everyone that unconditional rights merely as such must exist. Stout’s 
project is really more about what the modest view of justifying rights 
commits itself to when it accepts that unconditional rights and obligations 
exist. Human rights talk requires the democratic practice of exchanging 
reasons in support of our attribution of rights and obligations. Stout’s 
argument thus defends the modest possibility of human rights: he explains 
how we might be justified in believing that unconditional rights exist without 
first accepting a universal justification of such rights. We will actually believe 
in rights, of course, only if and insofar as we have reasons to do so—if we find 
torture intolerably cruel, for example. But that state of affairs is the end of a 
debate that must begin with engagement between opponents in a context of 
dialectical inquiry. To give that inquiry point, it is worth asking why we 
should continue talking about rights at all.19 
 
 
6. Why rights talk? 
 
Stout’s position might seem odd in another way. A modest view of justifying 
rights could seem … well, boring. Human rights seem to demand a lot of talk: 
if we wish to defend people against torture, we have to engage their torturers 
in dialectical argument, seeking sufficient existing or nascent common ground 
                                                       
19 I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out that Raz has published recently on the 
idea of rights without foundations. See Joseph Raz (2007), “Human Rights without 
Foundations,” Ragion Practica 29: 449. 
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with which to enrich their concepts of ‘cruelty’ and ‘norm user’, say, and 
steering them toward the conclusion we accept. The shape of that 
conversation cannot be determined in advance, because it will depend on the 
specific differences between us and them. So we cannot expect a standpoint-
neutral or universal justification of unconditional rights and obligations, 
though we can have local grounds for attributing such rights and obligations. 
If no universal justification is possible, why bother talking about human 
rights at all? What crucial role does rights talk fill? 
MacIntyre concludes that believing in rights is akin to believing in 
witches and unicorns, and he proposes that we eschew rights talk altogether 
and return to the tradition of virtues. Stout notes that  
The practical worry about such proposals can be expressed in the 
question, ‘When the powerful try to shut us out or hold us down, what are we 
supposed to do, beg?’ In a democratic culture begging and certain other 
expressions of deference come to seem responses unbecoming of a human 
being or fellow citizen. The language of rights arises in such a culture as an 
alternative to begging, on the one hand, and to certain kinds of coercion, such 
as torture and religiously motivated warfare, on the other (DT, 206). 
Stout is not here trying to justify rights, I think, so much as to explain 
the role that rights talk seems to fill better than anything else. Nothing in 
what Stout says guarantees that rights talk or claiming rights will win over 
the powerful who ‘try to shut us out or hold us down.’ Some states today still 
require citizens or subjects to beg or to show deference; rights talk is not 
ubiquitous. But begging and submission have been largely displaced in 
democratic regimes by the recognition that anyone might be a norm-user, 
anyone may stand up to the powerful and demand reasons, anyone can 
criticize the going social and political orders. At their best, people claim their 
rights and recognize the rights of others. And the rituals of domination and 
submission that go back deep into our evolutionary past subside also into our 
sociopolitical past. 
A right is a legitimate claim to certain goods—how do we know that any 
given claim is legitimate? For Stout, this issue is up for grabs: it is the 
business of democratic political life to answer this question in all the concrete 
instances where it arises. To leave this question open does not undermine the 
idea that some claims are legitimate: in his analogy, factual claims are about 
what is the case. Many of these are legitimate, but many are still in dispute. 
Where the available evidence settles a dispute beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then we have grounds for denying that all fact claims are arbitrary. The same 
logic applies in the sphere of rights. 
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Rights involve legitimate claims to the enjoyment of certain goods. We 
know that there are claims to the enjoyment of certain goods. People make 
such claims all the time. If some such claims are legitimately made on behalf 
of everyone—such as the claim not to be tortured and the claim to be free 
from humiliation—then there are human rights, and human rights are not 
essentially arbitrary. For rights are just statuses conferred by legitimate 
claims of this sort (DT, 207). 
Stout goes on to grant that the legitimacy of this kind of claim can be 
difficult to determine, but that is no different from the sphere of factual 
claims, some of which are also difficult to verify. The difficulty of 
establishing the legitimacy of any particular claim seems to be no ground in 
itself for skepticism or subjectivism in that domain. Again, this is an 
argument for the possibility of universal rights without universal rational 
justification. 
Rights talk serves several unique functions. It signals like nothing else a 
refusal to beg or submit, and thus symbolizes a democratic commitment to 
equality. Although the substance of rights talk is, in view of what Stout says, 
an open question, this stance reflects the fact that democracy is after all a 
political mode of resolving disputes in a pluralistic culture. As such it holds 
open even highly significant questions like those concerning the substance of 
human rights. Finally, rights talk imposes a responsibility on those who 
engage in it, namely the task of extending the role of ‘norm user’ (and, 
loosely speaking, ‘democrat’) to everyone. To recognize universal human 
rights is therefore to commit oneself to a kind of democratic evangelism, a 
spreading of the good news to all corners of the globe. This task is fraught 
with difficulty, given the suspicion with which many people in the world 
regard the political regimes of the West today. Yet here too rights talk serves 
a crucial function, allowing us to focus on local conditions of cruelty and 
terror that ground our own objections to torture and abuse, and to insist that 
these modes of justification are quite independent of the voracious appetites 
of the global multinational corporations and the aggressive and short-sighted 
policies of this or that Western political regime. These considerations do not 
go far at all toward telling us which rights to recognize. But they do offer 
reasons for continuing to talk about universal human rights, even when we 
acknowledge the failure of universal justifications of them. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
I began by articulating a very rough conception of human rights: they are 
moral rights, not merely conventional; they are unconditional, universal, 
high-priority norms or normative statuses; and their application is most 
useful perhaps in governing the relations between states and their citizens. 
The friends of human rights assert that we can provide a robust philosophical 
justification for these rights, whereas the opponents of rights assert that no 
such justification is forthcoming. Both sides of this dispute assume that the 
existence of human rights depends on whether such a robust justification is 
available. To paraphrase MacIntyre: one might agree with Dworkin that the 
absence of a robust justification of human rights fails to show that they do 
not exist, but the same line of argument can be used to defend the existence 
of witches and unicorns. 
I have tried to canvass some of the dominant perspectives on human 
rights and to explore their proposed justifications. The four main traditions 
of providing a universal justification for human rights include the natural 
rights, transcendental, contractarian, and consequentialist traditions. Each 
of these perspectives mounts a case in favor of human rights. In each case, 
decisive objections to the tradition’s approach to rights seem to undercut the 
likelihood of a universal, robust justification of them. An a priori 
demonstration that no such justification is possible seems unlikely; but a 
strong prima facie case exists for thinking so. 
The opponents of human rights should not rejoice, however, for human 
rights might well exist even if no robust demonstration proves it. That is my 
modest proposal. On a modest view, we might recognize human rights in the 
sense used in this paper, especially acknowledging their unconditional and 
universal character. Yet this view declines to offer a universal justification for 
rights, insisting that justification is, unlike truth, always a local matter, 
couched in a culturally and historically specific language. The modest view is 
prepared to attribute human rights to those who will not or cannot recognize 
that they have them; and in doing so it undertakes a commitment to try to 
justify those rights to their opponents. Recognizing human rights signals an 
unwillingness to beg and a limit to submission and submissiveness; in the 
place of these conflict-avoidance strategies, a commitment to rights 
substitutes an insistence on exchanging reasons through dialectical inquiry. 
Human rights are not the same tool, given the modest view of their 
justification, that many friends of human rights would like to have. On the 
robust view, to fail to recognize human rights in the face of a robust rational 
justification of them is pig-headed irrationality. The friends of human rights 
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might miss being able to claim the moral high ground in this robust way. On 
a modest view, the best we can do is to share our local justification of human 
rights and to hope that our audience is sufficiently virtuous to engage in the 
dialectical exchange needed for that audience to understand and accept that 
justification. My reasons for respecting human rights might not make sense 
to you, or they might not persuade you, and we might have to talk together 
for a long time, with great patience and good will, to reach agreement. The 
demands of consensus-building can be onerous, and many forces conspire to 
undermine these conversations about human rights, and they often fail. Still, 
the best we can do will have to be good enough. It will not make the task of 
defending rights any easier to pursue a universal rational justification that 
does not exist. Much better will be to rely on our own reasons, local and 
culturally specific though they be, for at least they are real. 
